A REPORT ON
THE INTER-PROFESSIONS CONFERENCE
MIGUEL A. DE CAPRILES *

I
INTRODUCTION

The Inter-Professions Conference on Education for Professional
L Responsibility, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York
and held at Buck Hill Falls on April 12-14, 1948, sought to assemble
about a hundred educators in business administration, engineering, law,
medicine, and theology "to exchange information and experience gained
from their work" with special reference to the need for professional
schools to graduate "not only highly skilled technicians, but intelligent,
responsible citizens and good men and women as well." 1
The program of the conference was divided into three sessions: (1)
on educational objectives, (2) on instruction in professional subjects,
and (3) on "humanistic and social" education of professional students. In general, the first session was intended to consider in broad
terms the responsibility of "professionaleducation, as distinguished from
all other educational influences," for the development of the student into
a competent professional practitioner, a useful citizen, and a wellrounded individual; the second was intended to examine and evaluate
the content and methods of technical professional training; and the
third was intended to explore how "social, political, and humanistic education" can be made an integral part of the student's professional development, and how far this can be accomplished by general education
in college, or by specific courses in the professional school, or by "introducing social and human aspects into strictly professional courses." I
It is no serious criticism of the conference that neither the formal
papers nor the ensuing discussion would remain confined within the announced perimeter of each session. It was evident that the major topics
of the program dealt with matters of fundamental concern to the five
professions represented,3 that all participants were genuinely interested
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director of the Inter-American Law
Institute, New York University School of Law.
1 From the Press Book prepared for the conference.
2 From "Information for Speakers and Members," by Provost lliott Dunlap
Smith, Carnegie Institute of Technology, December 30, 1947.
3 Of. Mr. Justice Douglas' address to the Yale Law School Association, May 13,
1948: "If ever a generation was called upon In a few short years, or perhaps
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in exchanging views and experiences, and that everyone felt that the
conference had served a useful purpose.
Accordingly, the editors of the JounwAL oF LEGAL EDUCATION suggested that the law teachers who' were present at this unique meeting
should report to their colleagues on (1) the value to legal education of
this interchange of ideas and experience, and (2) on the contribution of
the lawyers to the conference.
This paper attempts to present the first part of the proposed report.
In its preparation, I have solicited the views of the other, twenty-four
members of the law delegation; half of them have written me at varying lengths about their impressions of the 'conference.4 Without their
thoughtful comments, I fear that the difficulty of the assignment would
have been insuperable; with them, my task has been largely to integrate
the material thus obtained into a more or less connected story for the
information of our colleagues.
The conference produced, as might be expected, a wide variety of impressions among the law teachers present. Some came to the conclusion that the basic problems confronting the five professions are substantially the same; others felt that there were few, if any, common
problems. , Some of our colleagues found the greatest inter-communication in objectives rather than method; others thought that the meeting
would have been more fruitful if its whole focus had been on method.
However, all of my correspondents were of the opinion that the conference was stimulating and worth while, and at least one has formally
proposed its renewal. As I see it, some generalizations are possible;
I have attempted to present them under the following headings:
1. Implications of Professional Responsibility,
2. Basic Philosophical Problems, and
3. Technical Problems of Instruction.
months, to shape the destiny of the world we live in, it Is ours. Of all the people
of this generation, it is the professional classes who should take a prominent place
in shaping that destiny. Professional people are needed, not because they constitute a special class of appointed leaders, but because their training, though it
may have been poor, should have given them some inkling of the bold and comprehensive strokes of national and international action that must be taken if chaosreal, physical, cosmic chaos-is to be averted." Printed as Law in Eruption, 34
A.B.A.J. 674, 675 (1948). See also Dean Griswold's Foreword to the Report of the
XationaZ Law Studlent Coaference: "My final point . . . is the responsibility
of legal education for fostering and inculcating the budding lawyer's awareness of
the opportunity and responsibility of*the lawyer for service to the public. In some
ways this seems to me . . . the central problem of legal education." 1 J.
LEGAL ED. 64, 66-67 (1948).

4 .Mycorrespondents were: David F. Cavers, of Harvard; Elliott E. Cheatham,
of Columbia; Brainerd Currie, of Duke; Lon L. Fuller, of Harvard; Albert J.
Harno, of Illinois; Willard Hurst, of Wisconsin; Louis L. Jaffe, of Buffalo;
Clarence Morris, of Texas; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, of Minnesota; John litchie III,
of Virginia; W. Willard Wirtz, of Northwestern; and Reginald Heber Smith,
Director of the Survey of the Legal Profession, American Bar Association.
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II
IMPLICATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Since the keynote of the conference was "education for professional
responsibility," it was not surprising to find general agreement that the
professional school has some sort of duty to develop the professional responsibility of its graduates. However, professional responsibility was
considered at three different levels, with varying emphasis upon the role
of the professional school at each level: (1) the technical obligation
of the professional man to practice competently his specialty in the community; (2) the social obligation of the professional man to discharge
effectively his duties as a citizen; and (3) the social obligation of the
professional man to be aware of the opportunities and consequences of
professional skill and position-which, as Currie points out, is "a special
obligation transcending the obligation of citizens generally."
Dr. Homer IV. Smith, in the opening paper of the conference, started'
the fireworks by taking an extreme minority position. In substance, he
said, social responsibility involves value judgments; but there are no
"capital-letter" (absolute or universal), values, and value judgments
are beyond verification by scientific method, no matter how important
they may be as expedients of human relations. The medical school, as
a scientific school, should deal only with the scientifically verifiable;
therefore its role in education for professional responsibility should be
limited to technical proficiency. By inference, education in the formation of value judgments should be obtained elsewhere, presumably in,
the college, the church, the family.
A similar analysis, leading to a different conclusion, was made by
Rogers in terms of "that dichotomy introduced in the 1940 report of
the [S. P. E..E.] Committee on Aims and Scopes" of engineering curricula. Like Dr. Smith, he divided human thought into two sharply
drawn categories: (1) "scientific technological thought"-objective,
quantitative, logical, and pursued in an atmosphere of neutral detachment; and (2) "humanistic-social thought"-subjective, qualitative,
and seldom free from preconditioned emotional attitudes. The first,
characteristic of engineering, deals with objective realities; the second,
identified with "general" education, deals with subjective values. But
the engineers are not willing to limit the responsibility of the professional school to technical proficiency; they believe the engineer should
be trained in school to be a good citizen. Unfortunately, education for
citizenship in the liberal arts college is not satisfactory; "the engineer
finds little guidance for responsible citizenship in the typical courses of
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general education." I The solution, then, is to apply the superior method
of professional (i.e., engineering?) instruction to the humanistic-social
studies, and this can be accomplished only in the professional school.6
In summary, therefore, the position of the engineers generally (with the
possible exception of Dean Thomas K. Sherwood of M. I. T.) was but
a rationalization of the present engineering curricula, wherein' the two
types of instruction are offered concurrently to students -who as a rtle
have not been previously exposed. to -the general education offered by
the liberal-arts college.
In principle, the other professions agreed with engineering that the
professional school should graduate good citizens, and that education
for citizenship is substantially synonymous with a liberal education.7
But the dichotomy between technical and humanistic-social studies was
not so clear-cut among the business administrators, the theologians, and
the lawyers; the distinction was more pragmatic than functional, and
the question of the responsibility of the professional school was viewed
in a different focus. With the growing complexity of our civilization,
the professional school's burden in performing its primary technical task
becomes increasingly heavier; the "strictly professional" curriculum is
'crowded; problems of teaching personnel are more difficult.' Accordingly, the temptation is strong to seek relief by delegation of some of the
responsibility to the pre-professional school, which usually means the
liberal-arts college. The theologians, for example, emphasized that
5"Something is wrong with general education. There is some normative accord
among divergent ideas as to what is desired from general education in a free
society, but there is a great lack of agreement as to how accepted objectives may
be attained. . . .
[When] we come to the study of the subjective aspects of
the humanistic-social field and the appraisal of values as differentiated from the
weighing of quantitative facts, the engineer finds little guidance for responsible
-citizenship in the typical courses of general 'education." (From the summary of
President Rogers' paper on "Gaps Between the Statement and Achievement of Objectives in the Education of the Engineer.")
6 "Ifprofessional men are to participate in full in meeting the problems of society
they must be taught to apply their professional attitude and skill to dealing with
these problems. . . . This involves teaching these subjects by the same in-ductive and problem-solving methods of learning that have been discussed in this
conference as basic in professional education. . . . When courses in different
fields a-e thus taught as applications of a common professional way of thought,
work in each field-technical, social, or humanistic-adds its individual contribution to the general professional stature. . . . The responsibility of preparing
professional students for effective citizenship and cultivated living is thus a responsibility that professional education cannot delegate to general education. It can
,only be met if professional education makes its own objective the developient, not
merely of technical proficiency, but of a deeply and broadly cultivated professional
mind and spirit." (From the summary of Provost Smith's paper on "Professional
I)Iscipline versus General Education as a Preparation for Citizenship and Cultivated
Living.")
7Barrio points out that Greene's analysis of education In terms of language, fact,
value, and perspective is equally applicable to the pre-professional, the professional,
.and the post-professional periods in the education of the whole man.

ISO

JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

[VOL. 1

the college preparation of prospective seminary students should be broad
and liberal, excluding religion. The physicians likewise expressed preference for a cultural rather than a predominantly scientific pre-medical
program. Our prevailing concepts of pre-legal education are similar.
The basic idea is to work out a practical but complementary division of
labor; the main difficulty is one of integration. Hurst believes that one
of the most fruitful suggestions at the conference was the proposal "that
later conferences be held between liberal-arts educators and small professional committees" to achieve a closer correlation between humanisticsocial education at the college level and the demands of professional education.
In addition, however, all of the theologians and most of the physicians
-like the lawyers-generally accepted two ideas which were not discussed by the engineers: (1) that a broad, liberal education is more than
a mere supplement to technical training; it is also an integral part of
professional proficiency; and (2) that the professions have a special
social responsibility beyond the discharge of the duties of citizenship.
If these ideas are valid, it is obvious that the professional school cannot
delegate its obligations in the matter of education for social responsibility to the liberal-arts college.
For example, Muelder's discussion of theological education approached the ministry in terms of the relation of the parish to social action, including not only personal and family counseling but also social
work, labor relations, race relations, business, housing, social legislation,
religious liberty, and other civil rights. Romano's criticism of the present medical training dealt not only with its technical limitations (particularly with respect to convalescence, chronic disease, and disability), but
also in broad terms with the doctor-patient relationship, professional interest in medical education, financing of medical costs, etc.-in short,
medicine in the total social and economic scene. More concretely, Romano discussed the doctor-patient relationship in its ethical as well as
its psychological aspects. Father Murray 8 raised the question whether
ethical instruction is not in fact part of the formation process, in which
other educational agencies, such as the church and the family, have the
more significant influence; but Romano was certain that the task must
be undertaken by the professional school. Cavers made a similar point
at the conference in another connection; he restates it as follows:
SThe Reverend John Courtney Murray, S. J., of Woodstock College, Maryland.
Earlier in the discussions, Father Murray emphasized the danger of an indefinite
prolongation of the school years---postponement of the attainment of psychological
as well as professional maturity. The point seems to have substantial validity, but
was by-passed at the conference.
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I think it would be valuable for the pre-medical student to take a
good course dealing with the social, economic, and government problems
of providing adequate medical care in our society. However, I do
not think that even the requirement that such a course be taken by all
pre-medical students should relieve the medical schools of the obligation to devote some attention to the subject in their curricula. The
issues which confront the medical profession itself can be fully appreciated by the professional student only when his professional education
has advanced far enough to enable him to think as a professional man.
The pre-medical course would greatly facilitate the later consideration
of the question; it would not be a substitute.
The relevance of these views to legal education is reasonably clear.

As Jaffe points out,
All professions dealing with men and men's woes are humanistic and
social. . . . The law, more than medicine or divinity, finds its
way toward the humanistic by the academic approach, by the way of
reading and discussing. . . . The very stuff of the law itself is
humanistic and social and offers education along these lines when dealt
with as such.
There is no excuse, then, for the law-teaching profession if it fails to
educate its graduates for social responsibility, whether this be interpreted
in terms of good citizenship or of something more. Hurst writes:
The conference supplied confirmation from the thoughtfulness of
other disciplines that the law teachers have been touching real and
deep-lying problems when they have been concerned, as they have for
the past ten or fifteen years particularly, with (1) the policy bases
of law and its relation to the going values of our society, (2) the
closer integration of the study of law with the study of related fields
of social affairs, and (3) the more sharply focused inculcation of lawyers' skills.
Various suggestions on method are advanced by my correspondents.
One proposal is to transfer a year's study in social science and philosophy
from the college to the law school, on the theory that "college history
teaching, and much of economics and political science, could take on
much more significance
.
.
.
if they were interwoven with professional studies." A second possibility is to re-orient our traditional
subject matter, since "a good teacher of Crimes or Torts or Constitutional Law can deal just as well with 'humanistic and social education'
as a professor of sociology, philosophy, or English literature." Again,
the special social responsibility of the lawyer indicates "the imperative
need for more rather than less theory, interwoven with constant check
against the best knowledge we can try to construct of our society.
. Which means, among other things
.
.
. taking Jurisprudence and Legal History out of the category of pursuits for a handful of graduate students and devising means of making the seminar approach available to more of the 'C' students." Finally, the suggestion
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is made that education in specific social sciences, either before, during,
or after professional education, is not of primary importance; the essential thing is to integrate the moral and intellectual sides of professional education, and this integration is effective only if it emerges almost as a by-product of understanding.
0Qn the whole, the chief failure of the conference was the failure to
define clearly the special social responsibilities of each profession; consequently it was -impossible to resolve the problem of just what are the
professional school's social obligations. Romano remarked that the first
need in'dealing with the doctor-patient relationship is a real understanding of the demands of that relationship, and not simply an undifferentiated desire to do good or to help people. Fuller would apply the same
standard to the lawyei in his relation with his client, whether his client
be an individual, a group, or the whole of society.
Perhaps the law-teaching profession is ahead of the other disciplines
in thinking about the problem. Cheatham's analysis of the scope of the
special social responsibility of the professions includes: (1) "responsibility to the profession, as illustrated in references by the physicians
and the theologians to the contributions made by practitioners to the
training of students"; and (2) "responsibility for public leadership, in
and out of political office." Llewellyn's comments on the lawyer's responsibility for social policy, and Vanderbilt's remarks at the opening
of the third session concerning the lawyer's participation in politics,
were typical of the views expressed by other law teachers during the
discussions. But the general impression prevailed that little progress is
in fact being made by the professions-including the lawyers-in education for their special social responsibilities.
Cavers' comment on the failure of the conference to face this problem
squarely seems particularly apt:
I do not deplore this failure greatly . . . for I recognize that
the range of the conference was too wide for emphasis to be given to
all matters of consequence. However, I believe the fact that more
consideration of this segment of the conference's field did not emerge
spontaneously is itself a significant symptom of prevailing attitudes.
III
BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
An important by-product of the conference, deserving special mention, was the philosophical debate on the nature of values. Dr. Smith's
frontal attack on the existence of "capital-letter" values was, in Currie's
words, "a tour de force which enhanced the interest of the conference
by pitching much of the discussion on a philosophical plane, but which
enabled him really to avoid the subject under discussion." The gauntlet
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was picked up by Father Murray, a brilliant Jesuit who argued the
Catholic point of view, and by Professor Greene, who developed the urbane middle ground of liberal Protestantism. So much interest was
generated by the debate that a special period after the regular second
session was set aside for its continuance before a packed auditorium.
Thereafter (as noted by Harno, Hurst, Riesenfeld, and Ritchie), the
importance of value judgments bobbed up repeatedly in the conference.
Cheatham writes me: "The notable discussions by the materialist, the
priest, and the Yale philosopher highlighted the question, 'What can a
man believe?' They all assumed that some satisfying answer to this
question underlay the other aspects of responsibility." In my opinion,
Cavers' candid comment best expresses the impressions of most members of the audience:
The intense interest manifested at the conference in the philosophical debate was, I think, more than a tribute to the ability of the speakers. I believe they nourished a hidden hunger. All of us have been

so pressed by our particular problems, often problems of both breadth
and intricacy, that we have not been giving attention to basic premises.
On the other hand, the inquiry into first principles had this disappointing but by no means unusual feature-the consequences of adherence
to one view or another, from the standpoint of the teacher for a profession, were left to be drawn by the audience. This, I think, is a
division of labor that is not certain to be productive. The business
of extracting significant conclusions from premises as fundamental
as those that were being explored at the conference is, if anything,
more difficult than the business of arriving at the premises themselves.
In any event I must confess to being one of those who has not tackled
that job for himself, however pleased I should be to have some one
or two or three others take it on.

IV
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF INSTRUCTION
When the talk turned to the technical problems of instruction, the
range of intercommunication among the professions became distinctly
narrower. There were broad common denominators, of course, but the
exchange of experience in concrete situations was valuable principally
(as Wirtz points out) "in stimulating the participants to additional
thinking about problems which they are themselves in the best position
to attempt to solve."
The broad common denominators lay chiefly in basic attitudes and
objectives. It was generally recognized that every professional man's
job consists largely in making enlightened judgments in areas where
there is inadequate knowledge. The mastery of elementary skills is essential, but mere craftsmanship is not enough; there must be a conscious
attempt to develop a measure of professional maturity in the graduate
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of the professional school. As Currie puts it: "The objective is not to
teach the student all the faculty knows, but to try to inculcate the capacity to continue learning to handle problem situations. There was unanimous emphasis on the value of learning by doing, and all the professions
seemed especially interested in trying to find practicable means to that
end, with the objective of making the conditions as realistic as possible
while retaining a substantial degree of supervision." The rationale of
these basic attitudes and objectives is summarized by Cheatham thus:
The student should not be graduated and should not be turned loose
on the public until he has had enough of this training to enable him
to do a fairly adequate job. In other words, the professional school
owes a duty to see to it that the preliminary professional training of
its graduates is not had through inadequate and dangerous practice
on early clients or patients of the young professional man.
Another common denominator was the widespread willingness to experiment in seeking solutions. It is true that most of the engineers, and
certainly Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration, gave
the impression of complacent satisfaction with the high degree of perfection achieved in their curricula and teaching methods; it is also true
that every profession occasionally presented a pontifical spokesman.
But, by and large, there was ample self-criticism and a genuine interest in anything being tried by one profession which might serve as a
model for improvement of methods in another discipline.
It is impossible in this report to evaluate all of the concrete techniques
of professional instruction which were discussed at the conference. As
Ritchie points out: "With perhaps variant emphasis, each profession
had its champion of the 'skills' approach, the 'process' approach, the 'informational' emphasis, and perhaps even the 'great books' viewpoint, although I am a little dubious about engineering and business administration numbering any adherents to the 'great books' idea." My purpose,
therefore, is to present only those techniques described by the other
professions which in the opinion of my correspondents seemed to have
the greatest relevance to the problems of legal education.
It is significant that the interest of law teachers was centered exclusii ely upon "practical" teaching methods, which may be divided into two
major categories: (1) those which deal with the handling of specific
situations, such as the case system, the problem method, recorded interviews, role-playing; and (2) those which involve apprenticeship-firsthand experience with the more general run of professional practicesuch as clinical observation, clinical clerkship or supervised field work,
and interneship.
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Handling of specific situations
My correspondents make no comment on the engineers' "problem-solving method," 9 and only two mention the case system. Currie writes
me:
It was interesting to see what different things were meant by different
professions when they spoke of the "case system." I was reminded of
the preacher in Raintree County who catalogued the uses of tobacco:
Some it chew, some it smoke,
And some it up their nose do poke.
Clearly, the case method at the Harvard Business School . . . is
almost entirely a problem method; they have not learned its value from
the standpoint of inductive inference.

On the other hand

. ..

. . . we customarily give the student the "answer" along with the
facts, which discourages his thinking about the problem as such.
A more circuitous comment is made by Jaffe, who finds great difficulty
(as reported below) in duplicating the practical scene in the training of
law students, as compared with the medical clinic. First, he doubts that
the same problems exist in both professions:
Law even in practice is primarily concerned with "discourse."
"Facts," "business situations," and "domestic situations" are reproduced
in office and in court by discourse, and they are resolved by discourse.
Forms or arrangements constructed according to rules play a vast role
in counseling and in solutions of matured conflict. They, too, are discourse. Thus, the standard method of the law school, suitably expanded,
comes a good deal closer to practice in law than does book learning to
practice in medicine.
Accordingly, Jaffe would expand discourse on the case, on the statute,
on situations, on problems:
We can do more with drafting, with brief writing, with sample demonstrations of witness examination, with observations of courts and law
making bodies.

.

.

.

Why should not the student learn the correct

practice of forming a corporation, of closing a real-estate transaction,
empanelling a jury? Should he not be made aware of the hazards and
hurdles in a mortgage transaction, a sale, a lease-and be instructed in
in the available solutions?

.

.

.

Nor should we be frightened by

the bogey that by this attention to office problems we depart from the
true field of principle, of culture, of the study of man as man. With judicious management there is time for both.

.

.

.

There is a place

for the "course," the seminar, the mere, bare lecture, the textbook. We
can be much less rigid than we have been with respect to method, time,
and place.
0 The problem method was presented as "tiLe basio metloda whielL underlies
profesfonal thought. .

.

.

all

In dealing with any truly professional problem, to

reach a decision the engineer must study the situation carefully to ind out what
the problem is, must decide how to simplify it so that he can discover and apply

to it governing principles. Then he must devise a plan for using these principles

to reach a decision. After he has successfully carried through his plan and obtained a result he must check it thoroughly, which is an art in itself, and not until
then accept his decision. This method of reaching a professional decision is, I
believe, applicable in most professional fields." (From the summary of Professor
Teare's paper on "Method in the Problem-Solving ladness.")
I JounuxAL OF LEGAL ED.No.2-3
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As a final item under this topic, I report Hurst's impressions:
Two specific points of teaching technique re the instruction in craftsmanship stood out: (1) some divinity schools have been conducting experiments in instruction in interviewing [with the help of the wire recorder]; this could well be explored by the law schools; (2) discussidn
of "role-taking" work, as through dramatization of the handling of practical professional situations, served to remind of the almost untouched
opportunities in visual education, and in the joint production through
the A.A.L.S. of some experimental moving pictures.

Apprenticeship
Reginald Heber Smith observes: "The Conference [revealed] that
the legal profession is now the only profession that does not lean heavily
on the apprentice method of instruction.

.

.

.

Since legal edu-

cation started with the apprentice system, I was puzzled why modern
law teaching has totally lost it." The point has been raised before; it
seems to have thrown the university law school on the defensive. It is
not surprising, therefore, that law teachers evidenced the greatest interest in the experience of the other professions with apprenticeship in
its two main forms: (a) clinical training during the university years
under direct supervision of the professional school, and (b) interneship
involving virtually complete assumption of professional functions, subject to control by the organized profession rather than by the school as
such.
As one correspondent points out, interneship "came in for interesting
criticism." The experience of the professions has been generally unfortunate, except perhaps in- engineering, which seemed pleased with
its program of "progressive experience" in the field-sometimes during
the summer vacation, often after graduation, and always prior to licensure. McGiffert "ospoke of the exploitation of internes in the ministry,
and the meagerness of the educational value of interneship. Calkins,
describing "in-service" executive training for business administration,
indicated the need for supervision by the school in the interest of effective utilization of the student's time. Means suspected that the medical interneship and residence requirements are being carried too far, at
least by the specialty boards. It would seem, therefore, that the experience of these professions supports that of the legal profession in New
York, where the formal bar-admission requirement of a six-month office
clerkship (without university supervision) has been abolished because it
failed in most cases to accomplish the desired apprenticeship objective,
and became instead an instrument for exploitation of the young law
graduate.
10 President Arthur C. AMeGiffert, Jr., of Chicago Theological Seminary.
1 JouqnAL Or LEGAL ED.NO.2
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Clinical training, or equivalent field work under supervision, however, has fared well in the estimation of the professions, despite some
practical difficulties in organizing the work and in finding suitable teaching personnel. In theology, a year of supervised field work in hospitals
and asylums, scheduled between the second and third years of the seminary, is the core of training in spiritual and pastoral care. M. I. T.'s
"practice stations" seem to be essentially clinical. In medicine, the
salient features of the system are fairly well known: the first or preclinical part of the course--consisting of lectures, seminars, and laboratory work-is taught largely by pure scientists rather than physicians.
Clinical experience in the teaching hospital is the rule thereafter; the
student moves from the role of observer to that of collaborator with
the practitioner, taking responsibility for elementary decisions; eventually (in the third or fourth year) he enters upon his "clinical clerkship,"
where he assumes a substantial burden of responsibility. Lectures and
amphitheater demonstrations constitute a reduced portion of the curriculum in the third year, and are eliminated in the fourth year.
What is the relevance of these clinical training programs to law teaching? Clarence Morris writes: "I envied the clinical training of the
medics and concluded that law schools could never develop an apprentice
training that remotely approached the significance of medical apprenticeship. I fear that our apprentice training must be delegated to the profession itself." Jaffe analyzes the situation as follows:
Can the law schools find any equivalent comparable to the medical
clinic? One thing that I learned at the conference was that the student
in the medical clinic not only "sees" the patient but makes responsible
decisions of an elementary nature. The difficulty of duplicating this
method for law students is nearly insuperable. You can "see" a law suit
in action; and some court observation is good and feasible. As for the
rest you can only "see" legal situations being enacted if you are placed.
in an office. But "seeing" without the responsibility of decision (though
it may be very useful for learning) is not in any sense the equivalent
of being a lawyer.
Currie thinks well of the Minnesota legislative drafting bureau described

by Riesenfeld. Hurst considers other solutions:
For great urban centers, a vast expansion of legal aid work and of legal service offices for people of small means offers an almost undeveloped field for experiment in providing properly controlled clinical experience for law students or men just graduated; in the smaller towns
and rural areas, more experiment with preceptorial systems is called for,
and perhaps some modest experiment with legal aid and low-cost legal
service work.

Jaffe questions the legal-aid solution: "There are those who wonder
whether the law is well seen, fairly seen, through the rather sordid and
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unhappy concern of the indigent however deserving of our consideration." Perhaps the preceptorial alternative is more appealing; in principle it is a return to the office clerkship, but under the auspices of the
'university.
The obstacles, however, are serious ones. Hurst emphasizes the financial problems:
These things won't run themselves; they call for initial capital investment, and for continuing and real supervision.

.

.

The law

schools cannot as a practical budget matter carry this load, nor should
they fairly be expected to. If the organized bar in this country had been
earning its keep for the past generation, it would long since have entered the situation with financial as well as personnel help, and probably
only from the organized bar is there any practical hope in the predicta-"
ble future that any sizable changes can be made.
Jaffe, on the other hand, is more concerned with the problems of placement and supervision. Experience with law clerkships in the past would
indicate that the law school must demand some supervision over the office which undertakes the training of students. As a practical matter,
he notes, in the absence of formal requirements or sanctions, "there appears at present to be little likelihood of placing students in offices subject to the joint supervision of school and office."
This conclusion underlies Jaffe's program for further development of
the law-school method of "discourse," previously described. But such
a solution has obvious limitations: "In so far as legal practice rests in
wisdom and acquired technique, these can only be got by practice.
There can be no clinic of wisdom."
V
CONCLUSIONS

It might be noted, in closing, that none of the law teachers present
volunteered to speak for the profession in the five-minute summaries of
"lessons learned" at the last session. Certainly, on fundamental issues
and on most questions of method, little that was new for us emerged
from the conference. But there was ample evidence that the lawyers are
lagging behind some of the other professions in the achievement of specific educational objectives. Perhaps, as someone suggested "off the
record," the lesson is that we should stop theorizing about curriculum
and should start more spadework for the teaching we know we ought to
be doing. It may be a more damaging indictment of law teaching that
we have failed to make the bar aware of its special social responsibility to the profession itself for providing effective clinical opportunities
for our students.

